9/11 FBI records: Chilling find in Bradenton dumpster

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Freshly released but heavily censored FBI documents include tantalizing new information about events connected to the Sarasota Saudis who moved suddenly out of their home about two weeks before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, leaving behind clothing, jewelry and cars.

The documents were released to BrowardBulldog.org Monday amid ongoing Freedom of Information Act litigation. The news organization sued in 2012 after being denied access to the FBI’s file on a once-secret investigation focusing on Abdulaziz al-Hijji, his wife, Anoud, and her father, Esam Ghazzawi, an advisor to a Saudi prince.

An FBI letter accompanying the documents, the fourth batch to be released since the lawsuit was filed, cites national security and other reasons to justify why certain information was withheld. The letter does not explain why the documents were not previously acknowledged to exist.

One FBI report, dated April 3, 2002, recounts a chilling discovery made by the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office on Halloween 2001.

Deputies were called after a man with a Tunisian passport was observed disposing of items in a dumpster behind a storage facility he had rented in Bradenton.

The man’s name is blanked out, but the report says authorities who searched the dumpster found “a self-printed manual on terrorism and Jihad, a map of the inside of an unnamed airport, a rudimentary last will and testament, a weight to fuel ratio calculation for a Cessna 172 aircraft, flight training information from the Flight Training Center in Venice [Fla.] and printed maps of Publix shopping centers in Tampa Bay.”

The Flight Training Center is where 9/11 hijack pilot Ziad Jarrah, who was at the controls of United Airlines Flight 93 when it crashed in Shanksville, Pa, took flying lessons.

The three paragraphs that follow are completely blanked out. The reasons cited include information “specifically authorized under criteria established by [presidential] executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.”

The documents were located via court-ordered text searches using the names of the al-Hijjis and Ghazzawi. U.S. District Judge William J. Zloch in Fort Lauderdale is currently reviewing more than 80,000 pages of 9/11 records.

“This release suggests that the FBI has covered up information that is vitally important to public safety,” said Miami attorney Thomas Julin, who represents BrowardBulldog.org. “It’s startling that after initially denying they had any documents they continue to find new documents as the weeks and months roll by. Each new batch suggests there are many, many more documents.”

“There needs to be a full-scale explanation of what’s going on here,” said Julin.

The report of the Bradenton incident includes information about the al-Hijjis. The redactions, however, keep secret how what happened there ties back to the al-Hijjis.

The same is true about another FBI document dated Feb. 2, 2012.

On that day, FBI offices in Tampa and Charlotte, North Carolina, received information from Washington stamped “secret” stating that a “person of interest” in the FBI’s massive 9/11 investigation had returned to the United States.

The person, whose name is redacted, was reported to be “traveling to Texas and LA for business/tourism.” The person apparently told authorities upon entering the country that he could be reached in Charlotte. He provided a telephone number “associated with furniture manufacturers in North Carolina,” the report states.

Details about that were blanked out. But the report also states, “Tampa is notified that a person of interest to Tampa regarding the PENTTBOMB investigation has a valid visa for re-entry into the U.S.” PENTTBOMB is the FBI’s code name for its 9/11 investigation.

In all, the FBI released 11 pages Monday. They contain statements reiterating that the al-Hijjis had departed the United States in haste shortly before 9/11 and that “further investigation” had “revealed many connections” between them and persons associated with “attacks on 9/11/2001.”

Those statements flatly contradict the FBI’s public statements that agents found no connection between the al-Hijjis and the 9/11 plot.

Yet they dovetail with the account of a counterintelligence source who has said investigators in 2001 found evidence — phone records and photographs of license plates snapped at the entrance to the al-Hijjis’ Sarasota-area neighborhood — that showed Mohamed Atta, other hijackers and former Broward resident and current al-Qaeda fugitive Adnan Shukrijumah had visited the al-Hijji home.

None of that information, or even the fact that an investigation in Sarasota took place, was disclosed by the FBI to Congress’ Joint Inquiry into the attacks or to the 9/11 Commission, according to former Florida U.S. Sen. Bob Graham. Graham co-chaired the joint inquiry.

The documents, while stamped secret, are marked as having been formally classified earlier this month in accordance with the National Security Information Security Classification. The parts of the documents that were not released are to be kept secret until 2039.

Among other things, the government asserted that classification is necessary because the censored information pertains to foreign relations or foreign activities, including confidential sources.

“This could be about information considered embarrassing to Saudi Arabia,” said Julin. Fifteen of the 19 suicide hijackers were Saudi nationals.

The April 2002 FBI report contains additional new information, though the deletions make its full meaning difficult to discern.

It says the Tampa FBI office “has determined that [blank] is an antagonist of the United States of America. [Blank] resides in Jerusalem. [Blank] allegedly has held regular and recurring meetings at his residence to denounce and criticize the United States of America and its policies. [Blank] is allegedly an international businessman with great wealth.

“In November 2001, [blank] visited the United States for the first time. He traveled to Sarasota, Florida, opened a bank account and made initial queries into the purchase of property in south central Florida. [Blank] intends to establish a Muslim compound in Central Florida. [Blank] revealed that [blank] is fearful of [blank] and fears that [blank] intends to begin offensive operations against the United States if he is able to purchase property and establish a Muslim compound in Central Florida.”

Three follow-up lines are blanked out.

http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/07/01/4212644/fbi-records-chilling-find-in-bradenton.html
 
Any member of Congress who looked into it concluded that the FBI was repeatedly called off the investigation by the Bush White House (see this article). Was the Administration covering for the Saudi government because the Saudis were just executing the CIA plan?

http://nypost.com/2013/12/15/inside-the-saudi-911-coverup/
 
Wow, if you are Arab you can't even throw stuff in a dumpster without the government planting evidence.
 
Motherfucking O'Bama.

Seriously, this is going to open up a can of worms.
 
Wow, if you are Arab you can't even throw stuff in a dumpster without the government planting evidence.

Don't use lime from your green. A nice hunter or evergreen would be nice.
 
Real men don't say "font." In my day, you say that unknown word, the preacher shoots you with his rifle.
 
I eagerly await the GOP to turn this into another Benghazi debate.
 
1998 to 2001 would have been during Clinton's 2nd term. If you find the whole article tl;dr, at least read the first paragraph.

http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/viewSubCategory.asp?id=182

From 1998 to 2001, the Army Intelligence and Special Operations Command (AISOC) conducted a highly classified intelligence-gathering endeavor known as Able Danger. Its mission was to investigate the terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda, both inside the United States and abroad. By 1999, Able Danger had identified, by name, four of the future 9/11 hijackers -- including the ringleader, Mohammed Atta – as members of an al Qaeda cell based in Brooklyn, New York. But the AISOC never informed the FBI about the activities of these suspects, thus leaving them free to continue plotting and preparing for the 9/11 attacks with impunity.

On August 15, 2005, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, the first member of Able Danger to speak publicly about his role in the operation, told the press about Able Danger’s findings and detailed the policies that had caused the crucial intelligence to go unheeded. Shaffer explained that when Able Danger had tried to arrange a series of meetings in 2000 with the Washington field office of the FBI to share its information about Atta, military lawyers intervened and canceled the meetings, citing fear of controversy “if Able Danger was portrayed as a military operation that had violated the privacy of civilians who were legally in the United States." At the root of this fear was a clearly defined prohibition against inter-agency intelligence-sharing in terror investigations. This prohibition, commonly referred to as the “wall” blocking such communications, dated back to the Carter administration's 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which was enacted to defuse allegations of FBI espionage abuses.

In 1995, while America’s intelligence agencies were still investigating al Qaeda's 1993 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center, the Clinton administration strengthened FISA to a degree that was unprecedented. Specifically, Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick called for increased restrictions on information-sharing between intelligence (CIA) and law-enforcement (FBI) agencies. In a 1995 memo to then-FBI Director Louis Freeh and U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White, titled “Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations,” Gorelick wrote the following:


“We believe that it is prudent to establish a set of instructions that will more clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation from the more limited, but continued, criminal investigations. These procedures, which go beyond what is legally required, will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation.”

It should be noted that when Gorelick penned the aforementioned memo, President Clinton was extremely worried about ongoing FBI and CIA investigations into illegal Chinese contributions that had been made to his presidential campaign. Both the FBI and the CIA were churning up evidence damaging to the Democratic Party, its fundraisers, the Chinese, and ultimately the Clinton administration itself. It was also a period when the FBI had begun to systematically investigate weapons-technology theft by foreign powers, most notably Russia and China. Had FBI agents been able to confirm China's theft of such technology -- or its transfer of that technology to nations like Pakistan, Iran and Syria -- Clinton would have been forced by law and international treaty to react (and to thereby jeopardize the future flow of Chinese money into his political coffers).

Gorelick's 1995 memo emphasized Presidential Decision Directive 24 (PDD 24), which Clinton had signed the previous year. PDD 24 placed intelligence-gathering under the direct control of the President’s National Security Council, and ultimately the White House, through a four-level, top-down chain of command set up to stifle information-sharing and cooperation between intelligence and law-enforcement agencies. From the moment the directive was implemented, such information-sharing became a bureaucratic nightmare over which the President himself had final authority. Consequently, information lethal to Clinton and the Democratic Party languished inside the Justice Department, trapped behind PDD 24 and Gorelick’s “wall.”

The implications of this policy were enormous. Mary Jo White, a New York attorney and an experienced al Qaeda prosecutor, vehemently objected to the barrier Gorelick had erected between agencies. In a letter to Gorelick and Attorney General Janet Reno, White noted: “The most effective way to combat terrorism is with as few labels and walls as possible so that wherever permissible, the right and left hands are communicating.” White also wrote a second letter in which she warned that Gorelick's policy “could cost lives.”

Testifying before the 9/11 Commission in April of 2004, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft made his own observations about how the “wall” had greatly hindered terrorism investigations:

“In the days before September 11, the wall specifically impeded the investigation into Zacarias Moussaoui, Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. After the FBI arrested Moussaoui, agents became suspicious of his interest in commercial aircraft and sought approval for a criminal warrant to search his computer. The warrant was rejected because FBI officials feared breaching the wall. When the CIA finally told the FBI that al-Midhar and al-Hazmi were in the country in late August, agents in New York searched for the suspects. But because of the wall, FBI headquarters refused to allow criminal investigators who knew the most about the most recent al Qaeda attack to join the hunt for the suspected terrorists. At that time, a frustrated FBI investigator wrote headquarters, quote, 'Whatever has happened to this – someday someone will die – and wall or not – the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain problems.'’’

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate set about to craft legislation that would provide the government with new tools for combating terrorist threats facing America. As a result of these efforts, on October 26, 2001 the USA Patriot Act was passed, finally authorizing criminal investigators and intelligence agencies to cooperate on international terrorism cases.
 

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