MikeDC
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Bryan Caplan and Robin Hanson are debating cryonics and immortality.
I've always found this interesting, and not just in the Ted Williams' head sitting on a tuna can way. Would you agree or disagree with the idea that having (for lack of a better term) a “chain-of-consciousness” is essential for life?
I look at it as follows. Suppose I were cloned or uploaded, but I, MikeDC, remain alive as I’ve always been within this body. I wouldn’t consider my clones or uploads to be me. We may share unique memories and capabilities up to the moment of upload, but after that we grow apart. We’re separate instances of the same program.
My instance of the program is the only one I care about as “my life”. I might think it’d be nice to have other instances of myself out there, but it’d be in the same way it’d be nice to have an identical twin. At the end of the day, a copy would be another conscious, sentient life. Not my own.
Thus, if immortality were a movement of my conscious mind from my living (but perhaps soon to no longer be) body to a computer simulation, I’d certainly consider myself to still be alive.
Perhaps problematically from a philosophical perspective, I think I must consider myself dead if (as in your hypothetical above), the power were totally shut off to my brain, and I was then I was totally “restarted”. My understanding is that much of what is “me” is stored in “volatile RAM”, and even if my body were brought back to life, or a way were found to access the” non-volative RAM” in my cryonically frozen brain, much of that would be lost. Thus, the new life created when I’m unfrozen and uploaded would be based on me, but not me.
I've always found this interesting, and not just in the Ted Williams' head sitting on a tuna can way. Would you agree or disagree with the idea that having (for lack of a better term) a “chain-of-consciousness” is essential for life?
I look at it as follows. Suppose I were cloned or uploaded, but I, MikeDC, remain alive as I’ve always been within this body. I wouldn’t consider my clones or uploads to be me. We may share unique memories and capabilities up to the moment of upload, but after that we grow apart. We’re separate instances of the same program.
My instance of the program is the only one I care about as “my life”. I might think it’d be nice to have other instances of myself out there, but it’d be in the same way it’d be nice to have an identical twin. At the end of the day, a copy would be another conscious, sentient life. Not my own.
Thus, if immortality were a movement of my conscious mind from my living (but perhaps soon to no longer be) body to a computer simulation, I’d certainly consider myself to still be alive.
Perhaps problematically from a philosophical perspective, I think I must consider myself dead if (as in your hypothetical above), the power were totally shut off to my brain, and I was then I was totally “restarted”. My understanding is that much of what is “me” is stored in “volatile RAM”, and even if my body were brought back to life, or a way were found to access the” non-volative RAM” in my cryonically frozen brain, much of that would be lost. Thus, the new life created when I’m unfrozen and uploaded would be based on me, but not me.
