Interesting article from a Rockets fan blog

[SlyPokerDog]

In Part 2, I mused on the value of lottery picks, theorizing that perhaps they aren’t worth their opportunity cost if procured through contrived means.

But what if rebuilding itself isn’t worthwhile?

While etymologically a euphemism, rebuilding carries a romantic connotation in our lexicon. I’m not just referring to the process of tearing a team down – that’s necessary in many cases. By rebuilding, I’m speaking of the glorious fantasy to amass young talent, establish a so-called foundation, and then recline while enjoying a ten-year window of maturation.

I’m not so sure our attraction to this is rooted in practical considerations. It’s more likely that our conditioning dictates a desire for long-term affinity to and identification with a static group of players. Moreover, youth affords the vehicle to envision the group’s successful evolution.

Granted, I do concede that in theory, when successful, this process is the absolute ideal scenario – think Portland getting healthy and realizing their potential en route to four titles.

With that said, I don’t think it is wise to chase the utopian when recent history shows such a high rate of failure. Too often, teams force the process, trading quality vets for unknown commodities, or even worse, locking up young players to underserved contracts, simply for the sake of establishing a foundation.

The fall-out can be catastrophic. Perhaps it’s time to rethink the model.

**

This brings us to a discussion of present relevance: the rumors pertaining to a possible acquisition of Andre Iguodala or Caron Butler.

Iguodala is not really much better than Butler. He’s a better defender and better in the open court, but Butler has the more refined offensive skillset – Caron is far superior at creating off the dribble.

Yet our collective consciousness prefers Iguodala. He fits neatly into that rebuilding vision. He’s just 26. Acquiring Andre Iguodala is a subconscious enabler: we now have a young nucleus; a young nucleus that can grow together.

On the other hand, Butler is a letdown. A 30 year old. Merely another mercenary. This is not a guy you can build something with for an era. Does it not seem myopic? Does Daryl Morey have no foresight?

Our definition of foresight is flawed.

Foresight is not exclusive to the construction of a set foundation. Foresight pertains to the health of a franchise and is inclusive of all future considerations, most importantly, the flexibility to escape from unsuccessful situations.

Caron Butler does not contribute to a foundation. But getting Caron Butler would vastly improve this team, ensure competitiveness for the next two years, but also provide an escape route.

Butler has just one year remaining on his contract, owed a very reasonable $11million in 2010-2011; Iguodala will be due $16million in 2013-2014.

(This is not even mentioning that the poison pill that is Sam Dalembert’s contract would likely be attached to any Iguodala deal, pushing the Rockets into luxury tax hell for next season, likely prohibiting them from resigning their own free agents or addressing other needs.)

**

In the modern CBA era, perhaps the most pragmatic approach to personnel oversight entails, rather than the construction of one static team for the long haul, the planning and creation of separate teams in succession, wherein management continuously reloads, retaining flexibility and allowing the franchise to stay competitive in perpetuum.

Now, naturally, youth is preferred. Young players possess certain desirable attributes and are less likely to become injured.

However, the distinction is between preference and outright discrimination.

In the new model, you prefer youth, but you don’t place a premium upon it. Rather, you simply acquire talent, old or young, keeping assets in play, and maintaining competitiveness.

Each separate team would have a three-year half-life before the ushering of the next retooling.

This would eliminate the need for painful rebuilding, when gate receipts suffer as teams struggle both on the hardwood and in the market to unload undesirable long-term contracts.

The rebuilding vision is really a self-fulfilling cycle. Each group is torn down in lieu of the next crop until things go awry for them too and hopes fade into reality.

Just look at the Sixers: they moved Iverson to usher in the Iguodala era but are back once more in the same rut, shackled by exorbitant contracts. Does the vision ever bear fruit?

The new model would signal a radical departure from philosophical norms. We’re accustomed to the ten-year-window. Assemble them, give them time, it will come together.

Too many GM’s have lost their jobs putting all their eggs into one basket.

**

There are two dilemmas:

1. Chemistry – there is merit to the argument that a revolving-door philosophy isn’t conducive to chemistry development; that chemistry is a factor of longevity.

I would present this current Rockets team as my counter. They have arguably the best chemistry in the league yet have not been together for very long. I think that if a robust team philosophy is firmly entrenched, as is the case with Houston, and a premium is placed upon high IQ athletes, as the Rockets have done, this potential pitfall is avoided.

2. The greater dilemma would be confronting the throes of the fan base. The masses would never sign off; they’re stuck on primordial affinities and emotional attachments.

This would certainly be a concern. But in the end, winning heals all, and as the adage goes, if you win, they will come.

If any consolation, through even fleeting success in any odd year, teams would collect the revenue they would not have earned had the “all-in” approach failed and they were mired in mediocrity with no escape.

**

On a different note, in Part 2, I touched briefly on the issue of stars. I still feel they are necessary to win at the highest level. But they’re difficult to acquire. Is it wise to force it? There really are very few stars in this league and most of them were acquired through the draft.

Is Andre Iguodala worth his price-tag when he’s not really a true star? Is his acquisition worth taking on the chaff that is Sam Dalembert’s contract?

Rather than forcing through a bad trade for a pseudo-star, perhaps the ‘snowball’ approach is more advantageous: placing managerial emphasis on smaller moves, collecting small assets, while rolling along in competitiveness, until you can make a clean trade.

Case in point: While fans were upset, in want of immediate help, the Bonzi Wells – Bobby Jackson trade was what enabled the clean swap for Ron Artest.

Morey dealt off Wells and Jackson, taking back no chaff, rolled along, and did his diligence in the draft, maneuvering to acquire a prospect in Donte Greene whom other teams would find attractive.

Had Morey blown off the draft – like his predecessor – or forced through a bad deal for immediate help, the clean swap for Artest would not have been possible. Take back a little good without taking back any bad, and keep rolling.

While a team’s record might end up slightly worse, it probably stands the same chance at winning a title with no stars as it would with a pseudo-star; but it retains flexibility for future improvement.

Taking back Iguodala and Dalembert would push the team far into the red for next season. But imagine a more low-key McGrady trade – one where the team takes back only expiring contracts and a much less glamorous player than Iguodala. The team would retain financial flexibility and go into the summer with a shopping cart of assets to put to bid in a sign&trade deal for a real star like Chris Bosh; a real star worth his market rate.

Overpaying for a pseudo-star really makes little sense.

There’s a common criticism in existence that Daryl Morey “overvalues his players.” I’m not quite sure I understand the sentiment. I think it’s a lot more accurate to say that he simply properly values other teams’ players.

**

Everyone is on edge in anticipation of The Trade. The Big Splash. Daryl Morey’s signature moment; the acquisition of the latest franchise corner-stone. Caron Butler would certainly not fit that bill – he’s nothing but just a very good role player at this point.

We don’t know what will happen at the deadline. Morey could very well surprise us and take back Dalembert. Or, he could trade away McGrady for just expirings, taking back a young low-key asset in return. Another asset to put away in the pocket.

Whatever the Rockets decide to do this deadline, it most likely won’t be flashy; it won’t appeal to what fans had been hoping for since last summer. It most likely won’t activate the glorious vision of rebuilding or adding to a foundation.

On the surface, whatever the Rockets do may not make sense, but we can rest assured, it will be part of some plan.

It’s anyone’s guess what Daryl Morey will do but, big or small, whatever he has in mind, it will tell us more about his managerial philosophy than any transaction to date.

http://www.red94.net/?p=1021

 

[THE HCP]

In Part 2, I mused on the value of lottery picks, theorizing that perhaps they aren’t worth their opportunity cost if procured through contrived means.

But what if rebuilding itself isn’t worthwhile?

While etymologically a euphemism, rebuilding carries a romantic connotation in our lexicon. I’m not just referring to the process of tearing a team down – that’s necessary in many cases. By rebuilding, I’m speaking of the glorious fantasy to amass young talent, establish a so-called foundation, and then recline while enjoying a ten-year window of maturation.

I’m not so sure our attraction to this is rooted in practical considerations. It’s more likely that our conditioning dictates a desire for long-term affinity to and identification with a static group of players. Moreover, youth affords the vehicle to envision the group’s successful evolution.

Granted, I do concede that in theory, when successful, this process is the absolute ideal scenario – think Portland getting healthy and realizing their potential en route to four titles.

With that said, I don’t think it is wise to chase the utopian when recent history shows such a high rate of failure. Too often, teams force the process, trading quality vets for unknown commodities, or even worse, locking up young players to underserved contracts, simply for the sake of establishing a foundation.

The fall-out can be catastrophic. Perhaps it’s time to rethink the model.

**

This brings us to a discussion of present relevance: the rumors pertaining to a possible acquisition of Andre Iguodala or Caron Butler.

Iguodala is not really much better than Butler. He’s a better defender and better in the open court, but Butler has the more refined offensive skillset – Caron is far superior at creating off the dribble.

Yet our collective consciousness prefers Iguodala. He fits neatly into that rebuilding vision. He’s just 26. Acquiring Andre Iguodala is a subconscious enabler: we now have a young nucleus; a young nucleus that can grow together.

On the other hand, Butler is a letdown. A 30 year old. Merely another mercenary. This is not a guy you can build something with for an era. Does it not seem myopic? Does Daryl Morey have no foresight?

Our definition of foresight is flawed.

Foresight is not exclusive to the construction of a set foundation. Foresight pertains to the health of a franchise and is inclusive of all future considerations, most importantly, the flexibility to escape from unsuccessful situations.

Caron Butler does not contribute to a foundation. But getting Caron Butler would vastly improve this team, ensure competitiveness for the next two years, but also provide an escape route.

Butler has just one year remaining on his contract, owed a very reasonable $11million in 2010-2011; Iguodala will be due $16million in 2013-2014.

(This is not even mentioning that the poison pill that is Sam Dalembert’s contract would likely be attached to any Iguodala deal, pushing the Rockets into luxury tax hell for next season, likely prohibiting them from resigning their own free agents or addressing other needs.)

**

In the modern CBA era, perhaps the most pragmatic approach to personnel oversight entails, rather than the construction of one static team for the long haul, the planning and creation of separate teams in succession, wherein management continuously reloads, retaining flexibility and allowing the franchise to stay competitive in perpetuum.

Now, naturally, youth is preferred. Young players possess certain desirable attributes and are less likely to become injured.

However, the distinction is between preference and outright discrimination.

In the new model, you prefer youth, but you don’t place a premium upon it. Rather, you simply acquire talent, old or young, keeping assets in play, and maintaining competitiveness.

Each separate team would have a three-year half-life before the ushering of the next retooling.

This would eliminate the need for painful rebuilding, when gate receipts suffer as teams struggle both on the hardwood and in the market to unload undesirable long-term contracts.

The rebuilding vision is really a self-fulfilling cycle. Each group is torn down in lieu of the next crop until things go awry for them too and hopes fade into reality.

Just look at the Sixers: they moved Iverson to usher in the Iguodala era but are back once more in the same rut, shackled by exorbitant contracts. Does the vision ever bear fruit?

The new model would signal a radical departure from philosophical norms. We’re accustomed to the ten-year-window. Assemble them, give them time, it will come together.

Too many GM’s have lost their jobs putting all their eggs into one basket.

**

There are two dilemmas:

1. Chemistry – there is merit to the argument that a revolving-door philosophy isn’t conducive to chemistry development; that chemistry is a factor of longevity.

I would present this current Rockets team as my counter. They have arguably the best chemistry in the league yet have not been together for very long. I think that if a robust team philosophy is firmly entrenched, as is the case with Houston, and a premium is placed upon high IQ athletes, as the Rockets have done, this potential pitfall is avoided.

2. The greater dilemma would be confronting the throes of the fan base. The masses would never sign off; they’re stuck on primordial affinities and emotional attachments.

This would certainly be a concern. But in the end, winning heals all, and as the adage goes, if you win, they will come.

If any consolation, through even fleeting success in any odd year, teams would collect the revenue they would not have earned had the “all-in” approach failed and they were mired in mediocrity with no escape.

**

On a different note, in Part 2, I touched briefly on the issue of stars. I still feel they are necessary to win at the highest level. But they’re difficult to acquire. Is it wise to force it? There really are very few stars in this league and most of them were acquired through the draft.

Is Andre Iguodala worth his price-tag when he’s not really a true star? Is his acquisition worth taking on the chaff that is Sam Dalembert’s contract?

Rather than forcing through a bad trade for a pseudo-star, perhaps the ‘snowball’ approach is more advantageous: placing managerial emphasis on smaller moves, collecting small assets, while rolling along in competitiveness, until you can make a clean trade.

Case in point: While fans were upset, in want of immediate help, the Bonzi Wells – Bobby Jackson trade was what enabled the clean swap for Ron Artest.

Morey dealt off Wells and Jackson, taking back no chaff, rolled along, and did his diligence in the draft, maneuvering to acquire a prospect in Donte Greene whom other teams would find attractive.

Had Morey blown off the draft – like his predecessor – or forced through a bad deal for immediate help, the clean swap for Artest would not have been possible. Take back a little good without taking back any bad, and keep rolling.

While a team’s record might end up slightly worse, it probably stands the same chance at winning a title with no stars as it would with a pseudo-star; but it retains flexibility for future improvement.

Taking back Iguodala and Dalembert would push the team far into the red for next season. But imagine a more low-key McGrady trade – one where the team takes back only expiring contracts and a much less glamorous player than Iguodala. The team would retain financial flexibility and go into the summer with a shopping cart of assets to put to bid in a sign&trade deal for a real star like Chris Bosh; a real star worth his market rate.

Overpaying for a pseudo-star really makes little sense.

There’s a common criticism in existence that Daryl Morey “overvalues his players.” I’m not quite sure I understand the sentiment. I think it’s a lot more accurate to say that he simply properly values other teams’ players.

**

Everyone is on edge in anticipation of The Trade. The Big Splash. Daryl Morey’s signature moment; the acquisition of the latest franchise corner-stone. Caron Butler would certainly not fit that bill – he’s nothing but just a very good role player at this point.

We don’t know what will happen at the deadline. Morey could very well surprise us and take back Dalembert. Or, he could trade away McGrady for just expirings, taking back a young low-key asset in return. Another asset to put away in the pocket.

Whatever the Rockets decide to do this deadline, it most likely won’t be flashy; it won’t appeal to what fans had been hoping for since last summer. It most likely won’t activate the glorious vision of rebuilding or adding to a foundation.

On the surface, whatever the Rockets do may not make sense, but we can rest assured, it will be part of some plan.

It’s anyone’s guess what Daryl Morey will do but, big or small, whatever he has in mind, it will tell us more about his managerial philosophy than any transaction to date.



















WHAT?

 

[SlyPokerDog]

WHAT?

Not sure why you copy and pasted what I posted and added "WHAT?" to the end of it but maybe this will make it easier for you to understand:

Este artículo es una continuación de una serie titulada "Discernir Filosofía de Morey."
Sobre el proyecto de Noche 2006, había descrito la noticia de la Battier comercio Gay como "el momento en que había perdido la fe en la competencia de gestión.
Es un poco de humor a considerar hasta qué punto ha cambiado mi canción.
Después de una década de mala administración, el equipo parece encaminarse de nuevo en la dirección correcta bajo la dirección de Daryl Morey.

Morey es un acercamiento sin precedentes. Sin embargo, todavía, se sabe tan poco de su filosofía.

Si el éxito se confirma de alguna locura, ¿no se suplican la búsqueda de su método?

Más Preguntas para reflexionar

Un punto de partida natural para nuestra discusión es la decisión de Daryl Morey, para continuar la construcción de este equipo alrededor de Yao. Antes de su último revés, el centro ya había tenido una extensa historia de lesiones. Aún más preocupante son las probabilidades de que se enfrentó - la mayoría de los "gigantes" en la NBA la historia han tenido su carrera acortada por los problemas del pie.

Daryl Morey, fue sin duda consciente de ello y había tenido la oportunidad de negociar Yao año pasado, mientras se encontraba en buen estado de salud y por su valor de mercado. Yet he still retained him. Why? Sin embargo, todavía conserva de él. ¿Por qué?

En la superficie, esto no parece ser una decisión racional. Cada vez que los pasos de Yao Ming en un tribunal de la NBA, su valor se deprecia porque su riesgo de lesión aumenta [con el desgaste añadido.] Es muy posible que Morey consideró que debido a que el poste bajo dominante Goleadores eran tan escasos y valiosos que se justifica el riesgo. Sin embargo, tengo un momento difícil aceptar que una mente como la de Morey invertirá una proporción tan importante de su espacio en el tope en activo tan volátil.

Los puntos de explicación más plausible para el lucrativo asociaciones empresariales chinos presencia de Yao en la lista que ofrece el propietario Les Alexander. Si la llamada a conservar la propiedad de Yao fue impuesta, esta se presenta como el más cercano de comparación en nuestro estudio a las restricciones financieras impuestas a Billy Beane. En una liga sin límite, Beane no tenía dinero. A través de mantenimiento de Yao, Morey pudo haber sido obligada a funcionar con menos de un deporte con una gorra.

Con la decisión de petardeo Yao, que se señalan a la estrategia de sustitución de él. En el centro de 7'6, el equipo perdió su única oportunidad el bloqueo y la presencia en el poste bajo. Sin embargo, la respuesta de Morey era firmar un salto de tiro novato australiano e inserte el 6'6 Chuck Hayes en la alineación titular. Would sentido común dicta que al menos tratar de adquirir una presencia establecida en el interior?

En declaraciones a la pérdida del toletero Jason Giambi, Billy Beane, una vez dijo que "lo importante no es volver a crear el individuo .... Lo importante es volver a crear el conjunto".

Con los limitados recursos a su disposición, Daryl Morey, nunca podría haber encontrado un jugador que podría duplicar todos los talentos de Yao. En lugar de intentar reemplazar a Yao con un jugador similar, pero inferior, quizá la solución más eficaz es poner una prima en el atributo de Yao que la mayoría de la crítica necesaria para ser reemplazado?

Los números indican que el mayor impacto de Yao estaba a la defensiva. Podría muy bien se ha determinado que las actas se extiende el especialista defensivo Chuck Hayes 'fue la ruta que impactan más significativamente el equipo espera que la producción total.

Cualquiera que sea el caso, en lugar de tratar de imitar la receta del año pasado, Morey decidió que las cosas tienen que hacerse de manera muy diferente en esta temporada.

Hablando del año pasado, también quiero referirme a la decisión de negociar el veterano armador Rafer Alston a mitad de temporada. Pocos directores generales, han tenido el coraje para enfrentar la guardia punto de partida en medio de una carrera de postemporada. Uno podría suponer que los Rockets había enviado en sobre el anuncio de la cirugía de McGrady, pero que el caso, el equipo seguro que también han tratado el pronto-a-ser agente libre, Ron Artest.

Alston había sido el titular durante cuatro años, mientras que su eventual reemplazo, Aaron Brooks, todavía se confunde con el ex mariscal de los New Orleans Saints. A menos que Alston estaba tan mal, tal vez lo que veneran como "experiencia" en realidad no es tan crítica como la sabiduría convencional sugiere? Después de todo, ¿qué define la experiencia? ¿Cómo se puede cuantificar sus beneficios en relación con la producción presentada por un jugador más joven, más talentosos?

Si estamos ahondando en el existencialismo de baloncesto, entonces ahora probablemente sería un momento adecuado para preguntarse qué es exactamente un "escolta". Ningún gerente general de otros comenzaría tanto Trevor Ariza y Shane Battier conjuntamente en las alas. Los dos son inequívocamente el peor manejo del balón dúo alero de la liga. Daryl Morey lo sabe. ¿Esta decisión ilustra el desprecio de los papeles tradicionales de baloncesto?

¿Podría haber una creencia que lo que normalmente se espera que procedan de una fuente en particular, simplemente puede ser sustituido en el agregado de otras vías? Quizás Ariza y el impacto de la defensiva de Battier combinado fue proyectada para compensar la salida esperada sacrificado de un balón convencional de manejo de media ala ? Esta línea de razonamiento haría el papel de baloncesto tradicional obsoleta.

Una vez más podría hacer frente a esta decisión del equipo para empezar a Trevor y Shane en conjunto se basaba en la apatía, que no les importaba para competir en esta temporada perdido. Pero se que el caso, ¿no Morey simplemente han tratado Battier para jugadores más jóvenes ?

Así que ahora tenemos que estudiar la decisión de mantener a veteranos como Luis Scola y Battier, mientras que simultáneamente inaugurando la era de la reconstrucción. Apesta de confianza, sino que el equipo no ha sido mejor en el largo plazo mediante la venta de sus partes y el envejecimiento colocándose en posición para una mayor selección de lotería?

Tal vez, Daryl Morey dice que jugar a la lotería son bienes sobrevalorados, que no valen su precio de adquisición: el tiempo perdido. Tal vez las probabilidades de encontrar un colaborador más adelante en el proyecto son comparables a las probabilidades de encontrar uno en la lotería tarde?

Si usted siente que las probabilidades de aterrizaje de un jugador de "estrella" a través de la lotería no son relativamente altos, y usted sabe que el uso de sus métodos, usted puede encontrar un colaborador en un proyecto de ranura más tarde, ¿no es racional a cabo una prima más alta de la cultura desarrollada a través de la competitividad de la pequeña oportunidad de aterrizaje de una 'estrella' de 'llenar el tanque?

Por último, vamos a cerrar con la cuestión de lo que llamamos una "estrella." Ningún equipo en la era moderna se ha jactado de una lista en donde la producción de cada jugador proporcionalmente relacionado con sus ingresos. Pero, ¿precedente en un juego de cambio de servir de suficiente disuasión ideológica?

Intelectual ventaja competitiva en un mercado ineficiente puede hacer que la perspectiva de ganar a través de medios no convencionales como probabilístico como el éxito final a través del sacrificio de tiempo en la búsqueda de una verdadera estrella ".

No sabemos si este es el caso, pero, por supuesto, con nuestro tema, Daryl Morey, por lo que es realmente muy poco conocido.

 

[barfo]

I don't read spanish, so I took the liberty of translating to english:

This article is a continuation of a titled series " To discern Philosophy of Morey." On project at night 2006, it had described to the news of the Battier Gay commerce like " the moment at which there was lost the faith in the management competition.

It is a little humor to consider to what extent it has changed my song. After one decade of bad administration, the equipment seems to direct itself again in the right direction under the direction of Daryl Morey. Morey is an approach without precedents.

Nevertheless, still, it is known so little of his philosophy. If the success is confirmed of some madness, they do not beg the search of its method? More Questions to reflect A to begin with natural point for our discussion is the decision of Daryl Morey, to continue the construction of this equipment around Yao. Before its last reverse, the center already had had an extensive history of injuries.

Still more worrisome they are the probabilities that the majority of " faced -; gigantes" in the NBA history has had their race shortened by the problems of the foot. Daryl Morey, was without a doubt conscious of it and had had the opportunity to negotiate Yao last year, while it was in good be in favor of health and of its value of market.

Yet there am still retained him. Why? Nevertheless, still it conserves of him. Why?

In the surface, this does not seem to be a rational decision. Whenever the passages of Yao Ming in a court of the NBA, his value are depreciated because its risk of injury increases [with the wearing down addition.] It is very possible that Morey considered that because the post under dominant Goleadores was so little and valuable that the risk is justified.

Nevertheless, I have a little while difficult to accept that a mind as the one of Morey it will invest a so important proportion of his space in in active-duty so volatile top. The points of explanation more reasonable for lucrative the Chinese enterprise associations presence of Yao in the list that offers the proprietor Them Alexander.

If the call to conserve the property of Yao were imposed, this appears as nearest of comparison in our study the imposed financial restrictions to Billy Beane. In a league without limit, Beane did not have money. Through maintenance of Yao, Morey could be forced to work less than with a sport with a cap.

With the decision of I blow up Yao, that is indicated to the strategy of substitution of him. In center of 7' 6, the equipment lost its unique opportunity the blockade and the presence in the low post. Nevertheless, the answer of Morey was to sign a jump of Australian inexperienced shot and inserts 6' 6 Chuck Hayes in the titular alignment.

Felt Would common dictates that at least to try to acquire a presence established in the interior? In declarations to the loss of the toletero Jason Giambi, Billy Beane, once it said that " the important thing is not to return to create the individual….

The important thing is to return to create conjunto". With the limited resources its disposition, Daryl Morey, never could have found a player who could duplicate all the talents of Yao. Instead of to try to replace to Yao with a similar player, perhaps but inferior, the most effective solution is to put a premium in the attribute of Yao that the majority of the critic necessary to be replaced?

The numbers indicate that the greater impact of Yao was on the defense. It could has determined very well that the acts the defensive specialist Chuck extends Hayes ' it was the route that hits the full field equipment more significantly that the total production.

Whatever the case, instead of to try to imitate the prescription of the last year, Morey decided that the things must become of very different way in this season. Speaking of the last year, also I want to talk about to the decision to negotiate the shipbuilding veteran Rafer Alston in the middle of season.

Few chiefs of a main directorate, have had the anger to face the guard departure point in the middle of a postemporada race of. One could suppose that the Rockets had sent in on the announcement of the surgery of McGrady, but that the case, the equipment certainly also has tried soon-to-to be free agent, Rum Artest.

Alston had been the holder during four years, whereas his possible replacement, Aaron Brooks, still are confused with the ex- marshal of the New Orleans Saints. Unless Alston were so bad, perhaps what they venerate like " experiencia" in fact she is not as critical as the conventional wisdom suggests?

After all, what defines the experience? How it is possible to be quantified his benefits in relation to the production presented/displayed by a younger player, more talented? If we are going deep in the existencialismo of basketball, then now probably a little while it would be adapted to ask itself what is exactly " escolta".

No general manager of others would begin as much Trevor Ariza and Shane Battier in the wings jointly. Both they are unequivocally the worse handling of the ball pair eaves of the league. Daryl knows it to Morey.

This decision illustrates the scorn of the traditional papers of basketball? It could have a belief that what normally it hopes that they come in particular from a source, simply can be replaced in the aggregate of other routes? Perhaps Ariza and the impact of the defensive of combined Battier was projected to compensate the sacrificed awaited exit of a conventional ball of handling of average wing?

This line of reasoning would play the role of traditional basketball obsolete. Once again it could do against this decision of the equipment to begin Trevor and Shane altogether was based on the apathy, that did not matter to them to compete in this lost season. But that the case, Morey simply has not treated Battier for younger players?

So now we must study the decision to maintain to veterans like Luis Scola and Battier, whereas simultaneously inaugurating the era of the reconstruction.

It stinks out of confidence, but the equipment has not been better in the long term by means of the sale of its parts and the aging being placed On guard for a greater selection of lottery? Perhaps, Daryl Morey says that to play the lottery are overvalued goods, that are not worth their price of acquisition: the lost time.

Perhaps the probabilities of finding a collaborator more ahead in the project are comparable to the probabilities of finding one in the lottery takes? If you feel that the probabilities of landing of a player of " estrella" through the lottery they are not relatively high, and you know that the use of his methods, you can later find a collaborator in a groove project, a higher premium of the culture developed through the competitiveness of the small opportunity of one landing is not rational to end one more ' estrella' of ' to fill the tank?

Finally, we are going to close with the question than we called one " estrella." No equipment in the modern era has been boasted of a list where the production of each player proportionally related to its income. But, preceding in a game of change to serve as sufficient ideological dissuasion?

Intellectual competitive advantage in an inefficient market can do that the perspective to win through nonconventional means as probabilistic as the final success through sacrifice of time in the search of a true star ". We do not know if this it is the case, but, by all means, with our subject, Daryl Morey, reason why is really very little known.

barfo

 

[SlyPokerDog]

I don't read spanish, so I took the liberty of translating to english:



barfo

LOL!

A translation of a translation is my friend...

This article is a continuation of a titled series " To discern Philosophy of Morey." On project at night 2006, it had described to the news of the Battier Gay commerce like " the moment at which there was lost the faith in the management competition.

It is a little humor to consider to what extent it has changed my song. After one decade of bad administration, the equipment seems to direct itself again in the right direction under the direction of Daryl Morey. Morey is an approach without precedents.

Nevertheless, still, it is known so little of his philosophy. If the success is confirmed of some madness, they do not beg the search of its method? More Questions to reflect A to begin with natural point for our discussion is the decision of Daryl Morey, to continue the construction of this equipment around Yao. Before its last reverse, the center already had had an extensive history of injuries.

Still more worrisome they are the probabilities that the majority of " faced -; gigantes" in the NBA history has had their race shortened by the problems of the foot. Daryl Morey, was without a doubt conscious of it and had had the opportunity to negotiate Yao last year, while it was in good be in favor of health and of its value of market.

Yet there am still retained him. Why? Nevertheless, still it conserves of him. Why?

In the surface, this does not seem to be a rational decision. Whenever the passages of Yao Ming in a court of the NBA, his value are depreciated because its risk of injury increases [with the wearing down addition.] It is very possible that Morey considered that because the post under dominant Goleadores was so little and valuable that the risk is justified.

Nevertheless, I have a little while difficult to accept that a mind as the one of Morey it will invest a so important proportion of his space in in active-duty so volatile top. The points of explanation more reasonable for lucrative the Chinese enterprise associations presence of Yao in the list that offers the proprietor Them Alexander.

If the call to conserve the property of Yao were imposed, this appears as nearest of comparison in our study the imposed financial restrictions to Billy Beane. In a league without limit, Beane did not have money. Through maintenance of Yao, Morey could be forced to work less than with a sport with a cap.

With the decision of I blow up Yao, that is indicated to the strategy of substitution of him. In center of 7' 6, the equipment lost its unique opportunity the blockade and the presence in the low post. Nevertheless, the answer of Morey was to sign a jump of Australian inexperienced shot and inserts 6' 6 Chuck Hayes in the titular alignment.

Felt Would common dictates that at least to try to acquire a presence established in the interior? In declarations to the loss of the toletero Jason Giambi, Billy Beane, once it said that " the important thing is not to return to create the individual….

The important thing is to return to create conjunto". With the limited resources its disposition, Daryl Morey, never could have found a player who could duplicate all the talents of Yao. Instead of to try to replace to Yao with a similar player, perhaps but inferior, the most effective solution is to put a premium in the attribute of Yao that the majority of the critic necessary to be replaced?

The numbers indicate that the greater impact of Yao was on the defense. It could has determined very well that the acts the defensive specialist Chuck extends Hayes ' it was the route that hits the full field equipment more significantly that the total production.

Whatever the case, instead of to try to imitate the prescription of the last year, Morey decided that the things must become of very different way in this season. Speaking of the last year, also I want to talk about to the decision to negotiate the shipbuilding veteran Rafer Alston in the middle of season.

Few chiefs of a main directorate, have had the anger to face the guard departure point in the middle of a postemporada race of. One could suppose that the Rockets had sent in on the announcement of the surgery of McGrady, but that the case, the equipment certainly also has tried soon-to-to be free agent, Rum Artest.

Alston had been the holder during four years, whereas his possible replacement, Aaron Brooks, still are confused with the ex- marshal of the New Orleans Saints. Unless Alston were so bad, perhaps what they venerate like " experiencia" in fact she is not as critical as the conventional wisdom suggests?

After all, what defines the experience? How it is possible to be quantified his benefits in relation to the production presented/displayed by a younger player, more talented? If we are going deep in the existencialismo of basketball, then now probably a little while it would be adapted to ask itself what is exactly " escolta".

No general manager of others would begin as much Trevor Ariza and Shane Battier in the wings jointly. Both they are unequivocally the worse handling of the ball pair eaves of the league. Daryl knows it to Morey.

This decision illustrates the scorn of the traditional papers of basketball? It could have a belief that what normally it hopes that they come in particular from a source, simply can be replaced in the aggregate of other routes? Perhaps Ariza and the impact of the defensive of combined Battier was projected to compensate the sacrificed awaited exit of a conventional ball of handling of average wing?

This line of reasoning would play the role of traditional basketball obsolete. Once again it could do against this decision of the equipment to begin Trevor and Shane altogether was based on the apathy, that did not matter to them to compete in this lost season. But that the case, Morey simply has not treated Battier for younger players?

So now we must study the decision to maintain to veterans like Luis Scola and Battier, whereas simultaneously inaugurating the era of the reconstruction.

It stinks out of confidence, but the equipment has not been better in the long term by means of the sale of its parts and the aging being placed On guard for a greater selection of lottery? Perhaps, Daryl Morey says that to play the lottery are overvalued goods, that are not worth their price of acquisition: the lost time.

Perhaps the probabilities of finding a collaborator more ahead in the project are comparable to the probabilities of finding one in the lottery takes? If you feel that the probabilities of landing of a player of " estrella" through the lottery they are not relatively high, and you know that the use of his methods, you can later find a collaborator in a groove project, a higher premium of the culture developed through the competitiveness of the small opportunity of one landing is not rational to end one more ' estrella' of ' to fill the tank?

Finally, we are going to close with the question than we called one " estrella." No equipment in the modern era has been boasted of a list where the production of each player proportionally related to its income. But, preceding in a game of change to serve as sufficient ideological dissuasion?

Intellectual competitive advantage in an inefficient market can do that the perspective to win through nonconventional means as probabilistic as the final success through sacrifice of time in the search of a true star ". We do not know if this it is the case, but, by all means, with our subject, Daryl Morey, reason why is really very little known.

You know this might be the version of this article that HCP understands. Thanks for the help Barfo. You stinks out of confidence!

 

[MrSelfDestruct]

WHAT?

Not sure why you copy and pasted what I posted and added "WHAT?" to the end of it but maybe this will make it easier for you to understand:

I don't read spanish, so I took the liberty of translating to english:



barfo

HAHAHA!

Awesome thread! Would read again!

 

[UKRAINEFAN]

Thank you all. Those were hilarious!

 

[THE HCP]

Este artículo es una continuación de una serie titulada "Discernir Filosofía de Morey."
Sobre el proyecto de Noche 2006, había descrito la noticia de la Battier comercio Gay como "el momento en que había perdido la fe en la competencia de gestión.
Es un poco de humor a considerar hasta qué punto ha cambiado mi canción.
Después de una década de mala administración, el equipo parece encaminarse de nuevo en la dirección correcta bajo la dirección de Daryl Morey.

Morey es un acercamiento sin precedentes. Sin embargo, todavía, se sabe tan poco de su filosofía.

Si el éxito se confirma de alguna locura, ¿no se suplican la búsqueda de su método?

Más Preguntas para reflexionar

Un punto de partida natural para nuestra discusión es la decisión de Daryl Morey, para continuar la construcción de este equipo alrededor de Yao. Antes de su último revés, el centro ya había tenido una extensa historia de lesiones. Aún más preocupante son las probabilidades de que se enfrentó - la mayoría de los "gigantes" en la NBA la historia han tenido su carrera acortada por los problemas del pie.

Daryl Morey, fue sin duda consciente de ello y había tenido la oportunidad de negociar Yao año pasado, mientras se encontraba en buen estado de salud y por su valor de mercado. Yet he still retained him. Why? Sin embargo, todavía conserva de él. ¿Por qué?

En la superficie, esto no parece ser una decisión racional. Cada vez que los pasos de Yao Ming en un tribunal de la NBA, su valor se deprecia porque su riesgo de lesión aumenta [con el desgaste añadido.] Es muy posible que Morey consideró que debido a que el poste bajo dominante Goleadores eran tan escasos y valiosos que se justifica el riesgo. Sin embargo, tengo un momento difícil aceptar que una mente como la de Morey invertirá una proporción tan importante de su espacio en el tope en activo tan volátil.

Los puntos de explicación más plausible para el lucrativo asociaciones empresariales chinos presencia de Yao en la lista que ofrece el propietario Les Alexander. Si la llamada a conservar la propiedad de Yao fue impuesta, esta se presenta como el más cercano de comparación en nuestro estudio a las restricciones financieras impuestas a Billy Beane. En una liga sin límite, Beane no tenía dinero. A través de mantenimiento de Yao, Morey pudo haber sido obligada a funcionar con menos de un deporte con una gorra.

Con la decisión de petardeo Yao, que se señalan a la estrategia de sustitución de él. En el centro de 7'6, el equipo perdió su única oportunidad el bloqueo y la presencia en el poste bajo. Sin embargo, la respuesta de Morey era firmar un salto de tiro novato australiano e inserte el 6'6 Chuck Hayes en la alineación titular. Would sentido común dicta que al menos tratar de adquirir una presencia establecida en el interior?

En declaraciones a la pérdida del toletero Jason Giambi, Billy Beane, una vez dijo que "lo importante no es volver a crear el individuo .... Lo importante es volver a crear el conjunto".

Con los limitados recursos a su disposición, Daryl Morey, nunca podría haber encontrado un jugador que podría duplicar todos los talentos de Yao. En lugar de intentar reemplazar a Yao con un jugador similar, pero inferior, quizá la solución más eficaz es poner una prima en el atributo de Yao que la mayoría de la crítica necesaria para ser reemplazado?

Los números indican que el mayor impacto de Yao estaba a la defensiva. Podría muy bien se ha determinado que las actas se extiende el especialista defensivo Chuck Hayes 'fue la ruta que impactan más significativamente el equipo espera que la producción total.

Cualquiera que sea el caso, en lugar de tratar de imitar la receta del año pasado, Morey decidió que las cosas tienen que hacerse de manera muy diferente en esta temporada.

Hablando del año pasado, también quiero referirme a la decisión de negociar el veterano armador Rafer Alston a mitad de temporada. Pocos directores generales, han tenido el coraje para enfrentar la guardia punto de partida en medio de una carrera de postemporada. Uno podría suponer que los Rockets había enviado en sobre el anuncio de la cirugía de McGrady, pero que el caso, el equipo seguro que también han tratado el pronto-a-ser agente libre, Ron Artest.

Alston había sido el titular durante cuatro años, mientras que su eventual reemplazo, Aaron Brooks, todavía se confunde con el ex mariscal de los New Orleans Saints. A menos que Alston estaba tan mal, tal vez lo que veneran como "experiencia" en realidad no es tan crítica como la sabiduría convencional sugiere? Después de todo, ¿qué define la experiencia? ¿Cómo se puede cuantificar sus beneficios en relación con la producción presentada por un jugador más joven, más talentosos?

Si estamos ahondando en el existencialismo de baloncesto, entonces ahora probablemente sería un momento adecuado para preguntarse qué es exactamente un "escolta". Ningún gerente general de otros comenzaría tanto Trevor Ariza y Shane Battier conjuntamente en las alas. Los dos son inequívocamente el peor manejo del balón dúo alero de la liga. Daryl Morey lo sabe. ¿Esta decisión ilustra el desprecio de los papeles tradicionales de baloncesto?

¿Podría haber una creencia que lo que normalmente se espera que procedan de una fuente en particular, simplemente puede ser sustituido en el agregado de otras vías? Quizás Ariza y el impacto de la defensiva de Battier combinado fue proyectada para compensar la salida esperada sacrificado de un balón convencional de manejo de media ala ? Esta línea de razonamiento haría el papel de baloncesto tradicional obsoleta.

Una vez más podría hacer frente a esta decisión del equipo para empezar a Trevor y Shane en conjunto se basaba en la apatía, que no les importaba para competir en esta temporada perdido. Pero se que el caso, ¿no Morey simplemente han tratado Battier para jugadores más jóvenes ?

Así que ahora tenemos que estudiar la decisión de mantener a veteranos como Luis Scola y Battier, mientras que simultáneamente inaugurando la era de la reconstrucción. Apesta de confianza, sino que el equipo no ha sido mejor en el largo plazo mediante la venta de sus partes y el envejecimiento colocándose en posición para una mayor selección de lotería?

Tal vez, Daryl Morey dice que jugar a la lotería son bienes sobrevalorados, que no valen su precio de adquisición: el tiempo perdido. Tal vez las probabilidades de encontrar un colaborador más adelante en el proyecto son comparables a las probabilidades de encontrar uno en la lotería tarde?

Si usted siente que las probabilidades de aterrizaje de un jugador de "estrella" a través de la lotería no son relativamente altos, y usted sabe que el uso de sus métodos, usted puede encontrar un colaborador en un proyecto de ranura más tarde, ¿no es racional a cabo una prima más alta de la cultura desarrollada a través de la competitividad de la pequeña oportunidad de aterrizaje de una 'estrella' de 'llenar el tanque?

Por último, vamos a cerrar con la cuestión de lo que llamamos una "estrella." Ningún equipo en la era moderna se ha jactado de una lista en donde la producción de cada jugador proporcionalmente relacionado con sus ingresos. Pero, ¿precedente en un juego de cambio de servir de suficiente disuasión ideológica?

Intelectual ventaja competitiva en un mercado ineficiente puede hacer que la perspectiva de ganar a través de medios no convencionales como probabilístico como el éxito final a través del sacrificio de tiempo en la búsqueda de una verdadera estrella ".

No sabemos si este es el caso, pero, por supuesto, con nuestro tema, Daryl Morey, por lo que es realmente muy poco conocido.



A Si'. Muy bien, el burro sabe mas que tu'.

 

[BLAZER PROPHET]

Este artículo es una continuación de una serie titulada "Discernir Filosofía de Morey."
Sobre el proyecto de Noche 2006, había descrito la noticia de la Battier comercio Gay como "el momento en que había perdido la fe en la competencia de gestión.
Es un poco de humor a considerar hasta qué punto ha cambiado mi canción.
Después de una década de mala administración, el equipo parece encaminarse de nuevo en la dirección correcta bajo la dirección de Daryl Morey.

Morey es un acercamiento sin precedentes. Sin embargo, todavía, se sabe tan poco de su filosofía.

Si el éxito se confirma de alguna locura, ¿no se suplican la búsqueda de su método?

Más Preguntas para reflexionar

Un punto de partida natural para nuestra discusión es la decisión de Daryl Morey, para continuar la construcción de este equipo alrededor de Yao. Antes de su último revés, el centro ya había tenido una extensa historia de lesiones. Aún más preocupante son las probabilidades de que se enfrentó - la mayoría de los "gigantes" en la NBA la historia han tenido su carrera acortada por los problemas del pie.

Daryl Morey, fue sin duda consciente de ello y había tenido la oportunidad de negociar Yao año pasado, mientras se encontraba en buen estado de salud y por su valor de mercado. Yet he still retained him. Why? Sin embargo, todavía conserva de él. ¿Por qué?

En la superficie, esto no parece ser una decisión racional. Cada vez que los pasos de Yao Ming en un tribunal de la NBA, su valor se deprecia porque su riesgo de lesión aumenta [con el desgaste añadido.] Es muy posible que Morey consideró que debido a que el poste bajo dominante Goleadores eran tan escasos y valiosos que se justifica el riesgo. Sin embargo, tengo un momento difícil aceptar que una mente como la de Morey invertirá una proporción tan importante de su espacio en el tope en activo tan volátil.

Los puntos de explicación más plausible para el lucrativo asociaciones empresariales chinos presencia de Yao en la lista que ofrece el propietario Les Alexander. Si la llamada a conservar la propiedad de Yao fue impuesta, esta se presenta como el más cercano de comparación en nuestro estudio a las restricciones financieras impuestas a Billy Beane. En una liga sin límite, Beane no tenía dinero. A través de mantenimiento de Yao, Morey pudo haber sido obligada a funcionar con menos de un deporte con una gorra.

Con la decisión de petardeo Yao, que se señalan a la estrategia de sustitución de él. En el centro de 7'6, el equipo perdió su única oportunidad el bloqueo y la presencia en el poste bajo. Sin embargo, la respuesta de Morey era firmar un salto de tiro novato australiano e inserte el 6'6 Chuck Hayes en la alineación titular. Would sentido común dicta que al menos tratar de adquirir una presencia establecida en el interior?

En declaraciones a la pérdida del toletero Jason Giambi, Billy Beane, una vez dijo que "lo importante no es volver a crear el individuo .... Lo importante es volver a crear el conjunto".

Con los limitados recursos a su disposición, Daryl Morey, nunca podría haber encontrado un jugador que podría duplicar todos los talentos de Yao. En lugar de intentar reemplazar a Yao con un jugador similar, pero inferior, quizá la solución más eficaz es poner una prima en el atributo de Yao que la mayoría de la crítica necesaria para ser reemplazado?

Los números indican que el mayor impacto de Yao estaba a la defensiva. Podría muy bien se ha determinado que las actas se extiende el especialista defensivo Chuck Hayes 'fue la ruta que impactan más significativamente el equipo espera que la producción total.

Cualquiera que sea el caso, en lugar de tratar de imitar la receta del año pasado, Morey decidió que las cosas tienen que hacerse de manera muy diferente en esta temporada.

Hablando del año pasado, también quiero referirme a la decisión de negociar el veterano armador Rafer Alston a mitad de temporada. Pocos directores generales, han tenido el coraje para enfrentar la guardia punto de partida en medio de una carrera de postemporada. Uno podría suponer que los Rockets había enviado en sobre el anuncio de la cirugía de McGrady, pero que el caso, el equipo seguro que también han tratado el pronto-a-ser agente libre, Ron Artest.

Alston había sido el titular durante cuatro años, mientras que su eventual reemplazo, Aaron Brooks, todavía se confunde con el ex mariscal de los New Orleans Saints. A menos que Alston estaba tan mal, tal vez lo que veneran como "experiencia" en realidad no es tan crítica como la sabiduría convencional sugiere? Después de todo, ¿qué define la experiencia? ¿Cómo se puede cuantificar sus beneficios en relación con la producción presentada por un jugador más joven, más talentosos?

Si estamos ahondando en el existencialismo de baloncesto, entonces ahora probablemente sería un momento adecuado para preguntarse qué es exactamente un "escolta". Ningún gerente general de otros comenzaría tanto Trevor Ariza y Shane Battier conjuntamente en las alas. Los dos son inequívocamente el peor manejo del balón dúo alero de la liga. Daryl Morey lo sabe. ¿Esta decisión ilustra el desprecio de los papeles tradicionales de baloncesto?

¿Podría haber una creencia que lo que normalmente se espera que procedan de una fuente en particular, simplemente puede ser sustituido en el agregado de otras vías? Quizás Ariza y el impacto de la defensiva de Battier combinado fue proyectada para compensar la salida esperada sacrificado de un balón convencional de manejo de media ala ? Esta línea de razonamiento haría el papel de baloncesto tradicional obsoleta.

Una vez más podría hacer frente a esta decisión del equipo para empezar a Trevor y Shane en conjunto se basaba en la apatía, que no les importaba para competir en esta temporada perdido. Pero se que el caso, ¿no Morey simplemente han tratado Battier para jugadores más jóvenes ?

Así que ahora tenemos que estudiar la decisión de mantener a veteranos como Luis Scola y Battier, mientras que simultáneamente inaugurando la era de la reconstrucción. Apesta de confianza, sino que el equipo no ha sido mejor en el largo plazo mediante la venta de sus partes y el envejecimiento colocándose en posición para una mayor selección de lotería?

Tal vez, Daryl Morey dice que jugar a la lotería son bienes sobrevalorados, que no valen su precio de adquisición: el tiempo perdido. Tal vez las probabilidades de encontrar un colaborador más adelante en el proyecto son comparables a las probabilidades de encontrar uno en la lotería tarde?

Si usted siente que las probabilidades de aterrizaje de un jugador de "estrella" a través de la lotería no son relativamente altos, y usted sabe que el uso de sus métodos, usted puede encontrar un colaborador en un proyecto de ranura más tarde, ¿no es racional a cabo una prima más alta de la cultura desarrollada a través de la competitividad de la pequeña oportunidad de aterrizaje de una 'estrella' de 'llenar el tanque?

Por último, vamos a cerrar con la cuestión de lo que llamamos una "estrella." Ningún equipo en la era moderna se ha jactado de una lista en donde la producción de cada jugador proporcionalmente relacionado con sus ingresos. Pero, ¿precedente en un juego de cambio de servir de suficiente disuasión ideológica?

Intelectual ventaja competitiva en un mercado ineficiente puede hacer que la perspectiva de ganar a través de medios no convencionales como probabilístico como el éxito final a través del sacrificio de tiempo en la búsqueda de una verdadera estrella ".

No sabemos si este es el caso, pero, por supuesto, con nuestro tema, Daryl Morey, por lo que es realmente muy poco conocido.



A Si'. Muy bien, el burro sabe mas que tu'.

Agreed.

 

[axs88]

I think the HCP needs to discover the Quote button on the right.

 

[PtldPlatypus]

Well, in regard to the actual article, I think the most insightful point was this:

In the modern CBA era, perhaps the most pragmatic approach to personnel oversight entails, rather than the construction of one static team for the long haul, the planning and creation of separate teams in succession, wherein management continuously reloads, retaining flexibility and allowing the franchise to stay competitive in perpetuum.

The comments regarding potential acquisitions of "He doesn't fit our window" are ridiculous. Our window needs to not only be while Brandon Roy is between 28-32, but it needs to be now, then, and beyond, by layering the team with players at a variety of ages.

 

[Nikolokolus]

I don't have enough time to read something that poorly written.

 

[The Professional Fan]

What a fucking blow hard.

 

[hasoos]

Is there a translation to "Jive". I speak Jive!

 

[Minstrel]

I don't have enough time to read something that poorly written.

Heh, yeah. I began reading it, but couldn't plow through the writing style.

But skimming it, I got the gist. "Don't try to create a team of young players that will all develop together, creating a static winning team for a decade. Instead, build the best team you can and keep reloading in terms of veterans and keep a constant stream of young talent coming in through the draft."

That's always been my philosophy, too. I've never agreed with the idea "This team isn't really good enough to win the championship, so let's tear it all down, get much much worse and then start building." I think you should always, on some level, be building on what you have. It's easier to go from a 40 win team to a 50-60 win team than it is to go from a 40 win team down to a 20 win team and then up to a 50-60 win team.

There's a minmaxing belief that if you're not already championship-caliber, you should be absolutely crap, to maximize draft position and cap space and give yourself the best chance to build a great team. It sounds good in theory, but I think it's generally a failure in practice. Teams that tear down to nothing tend to stay bad for a long time.