Nuclear Attack?

[Denny Crane]

And there's this, from the World Medical Association:

http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b1.htm

THE WMA DECLARATION OF WASHINGTON ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Document 17.400
Initiated: September 2001 17.400
Adopted by the WMA General Assembly, Washington 2002
Editorial Changes made during the May 2003 Council Session

INTRODUCTION

1. The World Medical Association recognizes the growing threat that biological weapons might be used to cause devastating epidemics that could spread internationally. All countries are potentially at risk. The release of organisms causing smallpox, plague, anthrax or other diseases could prove catastrophic in terms of the resulting illnesses and deaths compounded by the panic such outbreaks would generate. At the same time, there is a growing potential for production of new microbial agents, as expertise in biotechnology grows and methods for genetic manipulation of organisms become simpler. These developments are of special concern to medical and public health professionals because it is they who best know the potential human suffering caused by epidemic disease and it is they who will bear primary responsibility for dealing with the victims of biological weapons. Thus, the World Medical Association believes that medical associations and all who are concerned with health care bear a special responsibility to lead in educating the public and policy makers about the implications of biological weapons and to mobilize universal support for condemning research, development, or use of such weapons as morally and ethically unacceptable.
2. Unlike the use of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons, the consequences of a biological attack are likely to be insidious. Their impact might continue with secondary and tertiary transmission of the agent, weeks or months after the initial epidemic. The consequences of a successful biological attack, especially if the infection were readily communicable, could far exceed those of a chemical or even a nuclear event. Given the ease of travel and increasing globalization, an outbreak anywhere in the world could be a threat to all nations.
3. A great many severe, acute illnesses occurring over a short span of time would almost certainly overwhelm the capacities of most health systems in both the developing and industrialized world. Health services throughout the world are struggling to meet the demands created by HIV/AIDS and antimicrobial-resistant organisms, the problems created by civil strife, refugees and crowded, unsanitary urban environments as well as the increased health needs of aging populations. Coping over a short period of time with large numbers of desperately ill persons could overwhelm entire health systems.
4. Actions can be taken to diminish the risk of biological weapons as well as the potentially harmful consequences of serious epidemics whatever their origin. International collaboration is needed to build a universal consensus that condemns the development, production, or use of biological weapons. Programs of surveillance are needed in all countries for the early detection, identification, and response to serious epidemic disease; health education and training is needed for professionals, civic leaders, and the public alike; and collaborative programs of research are needed to improve disease diagnosis, prevention, and treatment.
5. The proliferation of technology and scientific progress in biochemistry, biotechnology, and the life sciences provides the opportunity to create novel pathogens and diseases and simplified production methods for bioweapons. The technology is relatively inexpensive and, because production is similar to that used in biological facilities such as vaccine manufacturing, it is easy to obtain. Capacity to produce and effectively disperse biological weapons exists globally, allowing extremists (acting collectively or individually) to threaten governments and endanger peoples around the world. Nonproliferation and arms control measures can diminish but cannot completely eliminate the threat of biological weapons. Thus, there is a need for the creation of and adherence to a globally accepted ethos that rejects the development and use of biological weapons.

 

[porky88]

If you have a nation that's run be religious fanatics, then they're going to care little about retribution and are going to be looking forward to whatever their heaven promises. Suicide bombers don't care that they're going to die by their own act as well. I don't think the Iranian masses are like that, but their leader is sounding like a total crackpot/nutcase.

You can be insane and not want to die. That's how I see Iran and I really don't think what's his name (I don't want to try and spell it) isn't around more insane but also more realistic type of people. Plus I read that he's also not the true person in power there. That he's mainly a figure head. I think the whole nuke thing is them wanting to flex some muscle to the rest of the world. I really don't think a country like Iran wants to see the start of World War 3 anymore than we do.

Now I think them giving a nuke or details on how to make a nuke to a terrorist organization is the most likely scenario out of anything but even then chances are slim IMO because they also are at odds with a lot of organizations but if I was forced to guess I see something like that being more plausible than Iran declaring war on U.S.A. or Israel.

 

[DennisRodman]

http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/bk/bk12.html

[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Bacillus anthracis, for example, essentially fulfills the military specification, although anthrax victims may be treated up to several days after exposure with antibiotics. Therefore, only a minority of the infected persons will die from an anthrax attack in circumstances where appropriate medical response is possible, as was shown by the anthrax attacks in 2001 in the USA.

[/FONT] [FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]A very simple genetic intervention such as increased antibiotic resistance, however, could provoke much more deadly results by impairing timely and effective treatment. The technical possibilities for such manipulations are many, and are growing by the day. In many basic science research projects, methods to overcome current technical limitations in the military use of pathogenic agents have been demonstrated – sometimes unwittingly. Countless examples from the daily work of molecular biologists could be presented here, but one particularly interesting example is the transfer of “suntanning” genes: Many microorganisms are rapidly destroyed by bright sunshine (hence the Sunshine Project) and are thus only of limited use as a biowarfare agent. Many biological weapons are much more effectively used at night or dawn in order to avoid the destructive effect of the ultraviolet light. But “suntanning” genes may be introduced into microorganisms to confer UV resistance. In one experiment, genes coding for the synthesis of carotinoids have been transferred into harmless bacteria (Sandmann et al. 1998). Another possibility would be to engineer toxins into microorganisms that are naturally UV-protected (Manasherob et al. 2002). [/FONT]

I'm guessing this is stuff that may happen and may work in the future, but right now they can't get it to work. Or else regular crappy old curable anthrax, no one would care about, it would anthrax X or whatever. I'm doubting the military has made it, but maybe they do. (maybe they have cobalt bombs)