http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1
Despite the name change and supposed Iraqi leader, the foreign presence in leadership and membership of AQI continued to alienate local Iraqis. By December 2007, local concerns forced Abu Umar al-Baghdadi to issue a public statement claiming that only 200 foreign fighters were members of AQI. The number was questionable. It is true that AQI was majority Iraqi in 2006 but in 2007, the coalition forces captured records of 700 foreign nationals joining AQI and its affiliates between August 2006 and August 2007 alone..
[48] [49] [50] However, foreign fighters were on the decline, with fewer coming each month than earlier in the insurgency. Despite the decline, it is impossible to determine an exact number, and in any case Baghdadi’s declaration was not enough to convince many Iraqis.
[51]
The local resistance to AQI contributed to the Anbar Awakening, a movement of Sunnis in the Anbar Province to cooperate with U.S. forces in the region against the insurgency.
[52][53] The Awakening paved the way for increased U.S. and Iraqi security operations that ultimately diminished the capacity of AQI by the end of 2007. As a result, AQI was unable to provide security or enforce its extreme interpretations of Islamic law in the areas where it operated, and struggled to maintain territory.
[54]
By early 2008, coalition and local security forces had killed 2,400 AQI members and taken 8,800 prisoners. [55] By spring 2009, the U.S. was funding around 100,000 local Sunnis to fight AQI. [56] The local fighters carried out a campaign against the group, assassinating members and warning others not to work with the group. [57] By June, 2010, AQI had lost stable communication with AQ leadership, and 36 of AQI’s 42 leaders had been killed or captured. [58] [59] Through 2011, Coalition forces continued to coordinate efforts with tribal security forces, killing the majority of AQI’s leadership and leaving it in general disarray. [60]
Both Masri and Baghdadi were killed in a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid on April 18, 2010. After the April raid, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (not to be confused with the deceased, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi) assumed control of an AQI severely weakened by local backlash and coalition and local security forces.
[61] AQI continued to struggle to maintain relevance through 2011, when Coalition forces withdrew.
The December 2011 Coalition withdrawal signaled the end of AQI’s decline. Throughout 2012, with the group facing less pressure and security, the number of AQI attacks increased significantly.
[62] [63] In 2012 and 2013, Baghdadi led two separate terror campaigns in Iraq: in 2012, the “Breaking Walls” campaign targeted the Maliki government and prioritized freeing members from prison; in 2013, the “Soldier’s Harvest” campaign shifted the target to Iraqi security forces.
[64] [65]
Local political tensions, in addition to the absence of foreign security, expedited AQI’s return to prominence. In December 2012, Sunnis in Iraq began protesting the policies of the Shiite Maliki government in Anbar province. When Iraqi security forces invaded protest camps, Sunni attacks against Shiite targets increased; the civilian death toll in 2013 was double that of 2012. When Iraqi security forces attempted to clear a protest camp in Ramadi at the end of 2013, a local uprising drove the security forces out of much of Anbar Province, paving the way for later AQI expansion.
[66]
